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Abstract: In the last decade, increased environmental awareness has prompted the adoption of
incentives for exploiting renewable energy sources. Among these, biogas production has received
a certain attention in developed countries. Nonetheless, the subsidies provided have posed the
problem of an activity (the production of bioenergy) that engages in direct competition with food
and feed production for limited resources, like agricultural land. Even if this competition may
be softened by allocating marginal land and/or using dedicated non-agricultural crops, empirical
evidence shows that biogas plants have been developed in highly-productive agricultural areas,
using increasing amounts of maize silage as feedstock. Thus, studies aimed at measuring the effect of
biogas production on agricultural activities are needed in order to avoid this socially undesirable
outcome. The paper presents an econometric estimation of the impact of biogas plants on farmland
rental values of a Northern Italian rural area. Results show that biogas has a non-linear effect on
rental prices, suggesting that incentive schemes specifically accounting for plants’ dimensions and
technologies would improve the social sustainability of the bioenergy sector and its coexistence with
agricultural activity.
Keywords: biogas; farmland rental price; farmland value; environmental trilemma; bioenergy;
social sustainability; agricultural fixed resource; rent; agricultural land price; land use
1. Introduction
Increased environmental awareness, both in public opinion and in governments of many countries,
has prompted, over the last decades, the adoption of incentives for exploiting renewable energy sources.
Among these, the production of energy from agricultural products, such as biomass and biofuels,
generally termed as bio-energies, has received a certain attention in developed countries. The subsidies
provided to foster such productions have raised concerns for many reasons: for their cost, compared
to employment and welfare gains [1], and for the potential competition with traditional allocations of
farmland, devoted to food and feed production. The latter aspect, named as the “food, energy and
environment trilemma” [2], poses the problem of a further activity (the production of energy) that
engages in direct competition with food and feed production for limited resources like water and
agricultural land. As the latter is a fixed, non-renewable factor of production, it is plausible that such
competition affects primarily on its allocation and, consequently, on food prices. In this context, the
subsidization provided for bioenergy has changed the relative convenience among alternative uses of
agricultural land, increasing the relative profitability of crops for energy purposes. For this reason,
increasing attention has been paid on potential undesirable effects of such financial incentives on
existing supply chains [3–6]. Even if this competition may be softened by allocating marginal land
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for energy production [7] and/or using dedicated non-agricultural crops [8], its effects have been
perceived as increasingly harmful for other agricultural activities in highly productive areas. Potential
negative impacts of bioenergy production may be hampered where the same crop can be allocated to
feed both bioenergy plants and livestock. This is, for instance the case of biogas production, which, as a
consequence of dedicated subsidization policies, has been developed in highly productive agricultural
areas, using increasing amounts of maize silage as feedstock [9]. As suggested by Bartoli et al. [10],
an energy policy providing incentives for large-sized biogas plants, fed mainly with maize silage,
may increase the demand for such crops, increasing its price and, consequently, both feeding costs for
livestock farms and land prices. On the other hand, Bartoli et al. [10] show that an incentive structure
more favorable for plants fed mainly with livestock manure—small- and medium-sized—may render
biogas production more compatible with other agricultural activity. As the impact of biogas activity
may be highly pervasive, its impact on agricultural areas has been explored extensively by means of
modelling approaches. On the contrary, contributions focusing on its effect on land allocation and land
value and rental prices have been quite limited (see Section 2 for details). The aim of this paper is to
contribute to the current literature about the impact of biogas production on the rental prices. To do
so, we examine a case study in a province of Northern Italy, where the biogas industry has increased
sharply as a consequence of dedicated policies. The same province is also one of the most productive
for field crops and livestock, and we wanted to measure the extent to which the competition between
biogas and agricultural activities have impacted land rental prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the literature on determinants
of farmland rental price and previous evidence of the effect of biogas on the farmland market; the case
study, the data, and the econometric model are presented in Section 3; results are analytically discussed
in Section 4 while, in conclusion, some reflection on possible policy implications of the research
findings are gathered.
2. The Impact of Bioenergy on the Land Market: Evidence from the Literature Review
As we are interested in estimating the impact of biogas production on farmland rental values,
the literature review is focused, on one hand, on all potential determinants of land value and, on the
other hand, on the previous studies specifically addressing this issue.
Factors affecting the value of agricultural land have been extensively examined. A recent review
by Feichtinger and Salhofer [11], discussing the relationships between farmland value and agricultural
payments, classifies the potential determinants of farmland price in internal/agricultural variables and
external variables. The first group includes expected income and wealth from agricultural activity and
external subsidies. Indeed, all of the authors agree that the first factor affecting the market of farmland
is the rationale farmers’ objective of profit maximization. Thus, the willingness to pay for land is
directly related to its expected return, which depends on land use capability [12,13]. The significant
effect of public support to agriculture on land value is the second scientific cornerstone. In particular,
researchers focused on the extent to which payments are capitalized into farmland [14–17], some of
them using spatial econometrics [18].
As the observation and description of the relationship between external variables and farmland
value is complicated, it is more difficult to estimate their impact. Nonetheless, Feichtinger and
Salhofer [11] describe the three aspects that have been considered and measured by researchers
and steadily entered in the literature. They refer to the micro and macroeconomic context and the
urban competition for land. Microeconomic variables link to competition for land due to its possible
alternative use, such as livestock feeding [19] and manure density [20], controlling for the location
and dimension of the market [21]. Some adjustments have also been proposed considering the
macroeconomic indices of inflation and interest rate, the taxation costs connected to the farmland
market and the availability of bank credit [22]. Obviously the competition for land is especially
exerted by non-agricultural activities, whose effect is often controlled using indices of rurality and/or
urbanization, such as population density, distance from nearest cities, or relative importance of
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agriculture in the region [12] and, more recently, by quantification of non-market amenities of the
location [23].
Specifically, the impact of bioenergy on farmland use and value has been tackled from different
perspectives. Some studies propose an approach based on the observation and description of
the phenomenon from a qualitative and/or institutional point of view. An extensive general
review collecting findings from reports considering European countries has been proposed by
Swinnen et al. [24]. The research suggests that bioenergy is expected to exert an effect on farmland
market in Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden. Carrosio [25,26] proposes an institutional interpretation
of the biogas context in Italy which discusses different scenario analyses deriving from potential
changes in actual European bio-energy policies. Other studies present a modelling approach.
For example, Johansson and Azar [27] simulate the effects of a new climate policy scenario in the
US supporting biomass per bioenergy productions and calculate that the price of the farmland rental
price could increase five times by 2100. Mela and Canali [9] calculate the land required for energy
production depending on the substrate, thus suggesting different degrees of competition per different
energy policy scenario. Furthermore, papers by Ostermeyer and Schönau [28] and Appel et al. [29] are
based on agent-based modeling whose results predict that biogas may be more profitable for larger and
more competitive farms at the social cost of increasing the value of land, thus decreasing the market
power of smaller farmers. Finally, there are limited contributions that apply econometric methods
to measure the effect of biogas on farmland rental price. On the contrary, we are not aware of any
research that uses biogas plant characteristics as independent variables, while the following papers
enter this information as control parameters of the models. In the research by Kilian et al. [16] an
analysis on Bavarian cross-sectional data on land rental prices are presented. The installed kW per
hectare at the municipality level explains the increased demand for land for energy crops resulting in
positive significance on the utilized agricultural area (UAA) rental price. Emmann et al. [30] present
results from a survey conducted on 246 German farmers, estimating that the presence of biogas plants
in a 10 km radius has a weak significance over the maximum land rental price, while the installed
biogas power seems to have no effect on farmland price. Lastly, Hüttel and Odening [31] used the data
from public bids for farmland allocation entering the installed kW per hectare in an agrarian region in
the model and finding a positive correlation with rental value.
3. Data and Methods
3.1. The Analytical Framework: The Hedonic Pricing Model
Researchers interested in explaining the impact of different variables on farmland price may
normally refer to two different approaches, namely the net present value (NPV) model and the hedonic
pricing (HP) model [11]. The two methods propose different frameworks for the analysis of the same
issue. The NPV model argues that farmers are willing to pay a maximum price for land that equals
the expected returns and costs of using that land in the future. On the other hand, the HP model
describes the land as a good composed of different attributes, as proposed by Lancaster [32] and
Rosen [33]. Thus, the price that farmers are willing to pay for land is linked to the value/disvalue the
farmers recognize as farmland attributes at fixed market conditions. Despite this differentiation, linear
regression analysis is normally used to calculate the impact of explanatory variables on farmland price
in both models.
We decided to frame the analysis using the HP model, because it is suited to identify the significant
shifters to the land price and quantify their impact. The HP model is thus used to approximate R,
the farmland rent value, by a set of attributes A following the equation:
R = α+ βA + ε (1)
where α is a constant, β represents the vector of parameters that will be estimated, and ε is the
error term. As suggested by Feichtinger and Salhofer [11] the A attributes that create land value
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(that reasonably applies also for land rent) can be classified in internal and external agricultural
variables. Indicating by I and E these two groups of predictors, Equation (1) becomes:
R = α+ δI + ρE + ε (2)
where δ and ρ are vectors of internal and external agricultural variables respectively. Referring to
the shifters of biogas plants to farmland value, called B, they can be considered external agricultural
variables; thus, Equation (2) turns into:
R = α+ δI + (ϑB + γO) + ε (3)
Equation (3) helps to separate the effect of biogas plants characteristics from other external
variable, indicated by O. Given this framework, in order to analyse the effect of biogas plants on land
rental prices, we used regression analysis in the form of ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the
coefficients of Equation (3). Applying the HP principles, the significant estimated parameters of the
equation represent the change in rental price due to the change of the explanatory variable considered,
ceteris paribus. In fact, focusing on the effect of biogas plants on price, the vector ϑ in Equation (3) is
interpreted as:
ϑ =
∆R
∆B
(4)
The vector of coefficients ϑ then represents the changes of R due to one-point changes in variable B
(biogas plants characteristics—see Appendix A for an easy explanation).
3.2. Case Study and Data: The Land Rent Contracts in the Province of Cremona
The case study is represented by the biogas plants installed and the agricultural land rented in the
Province of Cremona. The area is a part of the Po Valley, located in the Lombardy Region in Northern
Italy and covers 1771 km2 (7.4% of the Lombardy area). The province had 361,610 inhabitants in 2015
(3.6% of the Lombardy and 0.6% of the Italian population, respectively) with a population density of
204.2 inhabitant per square kilometre. According to the most recent available data, the UAA is about
135,531 ha, of which 17.3% is rented with a density of 3.69 livestock units (LU/ha), above an Italian
average of 0.77 LU/ha (Our elaboration on Italian National Institute of Statistics–Istat–Census data,
2010). Thus, the Province of Cremona is a relevant case study for the analysis of the effect of the biogas
plants characteristics on land rental price, because of the potential competition for land devoted to
food, feed, and fuel production, as underlined by Vaccari et al. [34].
The Province of Cremona represents an interesting case study to analyze the effect of the biogas
industry on land rental prices, because it has 154 plants, having a total of 104,947 kW installed up
to 2014. The total nominal capacity installed in the area suggests that farmers producing food and
feed crops may be subject to an increase of land rental prices due to the growing demand of land for
energy crops. Furthermore, given the variability in terms of total and average kW installed within the
Province, as shown in Figure 1, it is supposed that the effect on the land rental market can be measured
under different conditions, allowing testing whether, and to what extent, the presence of biogas plants
influences land rental prices.
In order to study the change in land rental prices due to the presence and characteristics of biogas
plants in the Province of Cremona, we used data from different institutional databases. In particular,
land rental contract characteristics belong to information owned and gathered by the Associazione
fra proprietari di Fondi Rustici della Provincia di Cremona (Association of Landowners Cremona
province). This dataset is based on 2063 contracts signed between 2010 and 2014 by landowners and
farmers from the Province of Cremona and contains the information on land rental prices and relevant
cadastral data, such as the total rented area and the average dimension of rented land units. From the
agricultural information system of the Lombardy Region we collected data on tenant characteristics,
such as farm economic size (measured in standard output), type of farming, and agricultural use
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of rented land. Finally, the national databases of the Agricultural and Demographic Census of Istat
provided information on agricultural activity at the municipality level (livestock unit, UAA, and
dimension of municipalities), while data on biogas plant characteristics (location at the municipality
level and nominal capacity, i.e., installed power in kW) have been collected from Gestore Servizi
Elettrici (GSE) Spa (http://www.gse.it/en/Pages/default.aspx). Data from different databases have
been merged with the lease contracts according to the cadastral information of the rented farmland
plots’ and their municipality location.Energies 2016, 9, 965 5 of 25 
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We entered into the model the value of farmland rentals as the dependent variable, while the
independent variables used to explain its variability have been chosen according to the framework
proposed by Feichtinger and Salhofer [11] and their availability and adequateness. Particularly,
it is worth nothing that soil quality and macroeconomic measures are not considered because they
are available at a geographical scale that do not offer sufficient variance within the objects in the
sample. For the sake of brevity, Table 1 and Appendix B summarize the explanatory variables used
in the model, describing their codification, units of measure, and type according to Feichtinger and
Salhofer [11], while descriptive statistics of the variables are reported Appendix C, Tables C1 and C2.
This information can be divided in four main groups:
• Biogas plan data—g ve information about the quantity of plants and kW inst lled, the ype of
plants and their spatial distribution in t consider d area. The number of plants and th
kW installed approximate the dimension of the biogas sector (pl_m, pl_ , kw_m, and kw_r).
T ese variables are exp c ed to have a positive relationship with the price of the rent d area,
because hey should approximate the quantity of energy crops (maize silage) requested and the
effect of the shortage of available land [10]. Nonetheless, two more pieces information are ne ded
to improve the escription of this relatio ship. Firstly, it is known th t different fee stock bl nds
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must be adopted depending on the technology of each plant, so we approximated differences
in technology controlling for the average dimension of the plants (pp_m and pp_r). Secondly,
as transport costs constrain energy crop provision [10,35], the distance of the plants from rented
land has been approximated measuring the effect of kilowatts installed in the municipality and the
agrarian regions the land rental contracts pertain to. This approximation of the distances between
plants and rented land was an inevitable choice, due to the lack of georeferenced data.We used six
variables to measure the impact of biogas production. They are a set of three variables, computed
for two different buffers around each rental contract: at the municipal level (smaller buffer) and at
the level of agricultural region (larger buffer). As the estimated model is not spatially explicit, the
buffers are intended to account, indirectly, for the spatial effect of biogas plants on rental prices.
The three variables considered, namely the number of plants (pl), nominal capacity per hectare
(kw), and average size of the biogas plants (pp) used at different territorial levels (municipality
and agrarian region) bring different information, even if correlated:
# The number of biogas plants in a given area (municipality, pl_m, or agrarian region, pl_r)
affects the level of competition for feedstocks (manure, maize silage, or other crops).
As shown in recent studies on biogas in the same area [10,35,36], the transport costs for
biogas input and digestate spreading are non-linear, with an efficient ray of procurement
that depends on plant size and feedstock mix. As spatial information on the location
of rented land with respect to each biogas plant is missing, the model accounts for this
feature by including the number of biogas plants in the surroundings of rented land.
These variables capture the overlapping effect of efficient rays of feedstock procurement
among biogas plants.
# The nominal capacity of biogas per hectare of UAA (municipality, kw_m, or agrarian region,
kw_r) bring information on the density of the installed power and measure the demand for
energy crops.
# The average size of biogas plants (municipality, pp_m, or agrarian region, pp_r) allows
capturing the different technology of biogas production. In particular, small- and
medium-sized biogas plants use larger proportions of manure and slurry that may decrease
the value of land used for slurry location. On the other hand, large-sized plants are
fed mainly with energy crops (maize silage), that may increase the demand of land for
that purpose.
• Agricultural land use data—give information about farmers’ choices on land use and approximate
if rented land is suited for the cultivation of certain crops. In our case, availability for maize and
energy crops is expected to be directly related to the land rental price.
• Contract signature data—show when the contract was signed. This is considered relevant with
reference to Italian subsidization schemes for biogas that changed in 2013 (according to Ministerial
Decree 6 July 2012 [37]). The variable’s coefficient may change over years as an effect of change in
policies. The institutional factors are decisive for the kind of biogas plants established, their scale,
and the technology employed [25,26].
• Agrarian regions—represent a macro-statistic unit that groups municipalities having similar
rural characteristics. As for land use data, different agrarian regions may have very different
characteristics [38] that should be taken into account to control for unobserved spatial
variability [16,31].
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Table 1. Description of dependent and explicatory variables used to describe variability in land rental prices.
Variables Description of the Variable Unit of Measure
Explanation of Land Rent Values
Internal/Agricultural Variables External Variables
Returns from
Agricultural
Production
Government
Payments
Variables
Describing the
Market
Urban
Pressure
Indicators
Rent value (Dependent) Price of land rental per hectare per year €/ha
Biogas plants related variables
pl_m Number of biogas plants per municipality Number of plants X X
kw_m Kilowatt per hectare of utilized agricultural area in the municipality kW/ha X X
pp_m Average power of biogas plants in the municipality kW X X
pl_r Number of biogas plants per agrarian region Number of plants X X
kw_r Kilowatt per hectare of utilized agricultural area in the agrarian region kW/ha X X
pp_r Average power of biogas plants in the agrarian region kW X X
liv Livestock unit per utilized agricultural area in the municipality LU/ha X
Agricultural land use—Reference = w&u_s
w&u_s Share of land used for wood crops or uncultivated % (ha/ha) X
mai_s Share of land used for maize and/or arable crops % (ha/ha) X
ene_s Share of land used for energy crops % (ha/ha) X
foa_s Share of land used for forage alternation % (ha/ha) X
fop_s Share of land used for permanent forage % (ha/ha) X
veg_s Share of land used for vegetables % (ha/ha) X
vif_s Share of land used for vine and/or orchard % (ha/ha) X
nur_s Share of land used for plant nursery % (ha/ha) X
Year—Reference = 2010
2010 Contract signed in 2010 Dummy (Yes/No) X
2011 Contract signed in 2011 Dummy (Yes/No) X
2012 Contract signed in 2012 Dummy (Yes/No) X
2013 Contract signed in 2013 Dummy (Yes/No) X
2014 Contract signed in 2014 Dummy (Yes/No) X
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Table 1. Cont.
Variables Description of the Variable Unit of Measure
Explanation of Land Rent Values
Internal/Agricultural Variables External Variables
Returns from
Agricultural
Production
Government
Payments
Variables
Describing the
Market
Urban
Pressure
Indicators
Agrarian Region—Reference = 19-07
19-01 Pianura Cremasca Dummy (Yes/No) X
19-02 Pianura di Crema Dummy (Yes/No) X
19-03 Pianura soresinese dell’Adda Dummy (Yes/No) X
19-04 Pianura di Soresina Dummy (Yes/No) X
19-05 Pianura di Cremona Dummy (Yes/No) X
19-06 Pianura fra Oglio e Po Dummy (Yes/No) X
19-07 Pianura di Piadena Dummy (Yes/No) X
Other control variables
dim_c Dimension of the rented area by contract ha X
dim_u Average dimension of agricultural units within the contracts ha X
len Length of the contract Years X
uaa Share of utilized agricultural area within the municipality % (ha/ha) X
cap Common Agricultural Policy’s (CAP) subsidies coupled to the contract Dummy (Yes/No) X
bui Presence of rural building on the rented area Dummy (Yes/No) X
sto Standard output of the farm of the land tenant €/year X X
Form sc_1 to sc_3 Presence of second crops Dummy (Yes/No) * X
From own_1 to own_4 Type of land owner Categorical—4 items * X
Form tf _0 to tf _27 Type of farming Categorical—28 items * X
* see Appendix B.
Energies 2016, 9, 965 9 of 23
3.3. Estimation Strategy and Limitations of the Model
As mentioned, the hedonic price model presented in Section 3.1 has been estimated using OLS
regression calculated with STATA (Stata Statistical Software Release 13.1, StataCorp LP, College Station,
TX, USA, http://www.stata.com/). The regression has been firstly adjusted for heteroscedasticity
using Huber-White sandwich estimators. Secondly, as land values may exhibit spatial correlation, it has
been necessary to check for it. Moran’s I test has been used both on the dependent variable (each year
and for the full sample used in the regression) and on the residuals of the regression (Model 5 in Table 2
in the next section), as its results allow rejecting the presence of spatial correlation or considering
negligible the magnitude of such a feature.
The effect of biogas on land prices has been tested using a polynomial specification (variable in
level and squared) to capture non-linear effects. The rationale behind using such a functional form
relies on specific features of biogas production. These are non-linear transportation costs of input
(energy crops and slurry) and output (digestate), as outlined in studies carried out in the same
area [10,35,36]. Thus, it is plausible to assume that the non-linearity in transportation costs may
translate in non-linear effects of biogas on rental prices. In order to check the reliability of the
non-linear relationships among dependent and biogas variables, a Ramsey’s RESET test and an F-test
of joint non-significance of biogas parameter estimates have been performed. The joint results of these
tests indicate the linear-polynomial as an acceptable specification.
The robustness of the abovementioned regression strategy may be affected by missing data on soil
quality at an adequate scale (parcel/contract level). Unlike other papers in the same field [18] we do
not have data on soil quality at the parcel level; our data, (classified according to land capability using
the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA) soil taxonomy), are rendered to a scale (1:50,000)
that does not allow enough variability within the area examined. As soil quality is an important
attribute of land value, its exclusion from our hedonic model may lead to biased estimates of other
attributes. Such distortion may be mitigated by including land uses in the model. It is intuitive, in fact,
that land use and soil quality are correlated, to some extent. The same issue applies to relevant data
that are available at the province level, such as macroeconomic variables as classified according to
Feichtinger and Salhofer [11].
A final relevant limitation deserves to be mentioned. Farmland can be used for many crops and
land values are simultaneously in equilibrium with food, feed, and bioenergy markets. An increased
demand of land for energy purposes incurs competition with alternative, uses such as maize for
livestock feeding, pushing-up land values. However, this causal effect may actually be counterbalanced
by the import of maize from other countries. Due to the lack of data, we could not control for this effect.
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Table 2. Explanatory variables for land rental price per year in ordinary least squares (OLS) models.
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Biogas Variables at
Municipality Level
Biogas Variables at
Agrarian Region Level
Biogas Variables at Municipality
Level w/out Nominal Capacity per ha
Biogas Variables at Agrarian Region
Level w/out Nominal Capacity per ha
Biogas Variables at Municipality
and Agrarian Region Level
R-squared 0.221 0.225 0.218 0.233 0.236
Rent value (Dependent) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Biogas variables
pl_m 95.146 *** - - 86.870 ** 90.728 ** 99.324 ***
pl_m2 −11.096 ** - - −11.605 ** −12.553 ** −12.189 **
kw_m −102.594 - - - - - - - −107.459 -
kw_m2 16.670 - - - - - - - 19.370 -
pp_m −0.370 - - - −0.428 * −0.418 ** −0.353 *
pp_m2 0.000 ** - - 0.000 * 0.000 ** 0.000 **
pl_r - - −82.401 ** - - −84.986 *** −86.974 ***
pl_r2 - - 1.704 ** - - 1.758 ** 1.784 ***
kw_r - - 2324.436 ** - - 2332.303 ** 2348.650 **
kw_r2 - - −1477.331 ** - - −1482.357 ** −1478.670 **
pp_r - - −1.209 ** - - −1.103 ** −1.120 **
pp_r2 - - 0.001 * - - 0.001 - 0.001 -
liv 13.781 ** 13.383 ** 13.212 ** 12.015 ** 12.577 **
Agricultural land use—Reference = w&u_s
mai_s 282.483 * 245.839 - 281.272 * 263.700 - 262.627 -
ene_s 386.007 ** 342.262 * 373.166 ** 367.937 * 378.485 *
foa_s 332.679 ** 288.864 * 332.186 ** 306.245 * 304.234 *
fop_s 224.009 - 194.369 - 215.671 - 206.667 - 211.729 -
veg_s 399.413 ** 354.481 * 401.833 ** 379.191 ** 374.293 **
vif_s 93,348.110 - 142,171.800 - 107,891.300 - 117,222.400 - 103,186.900 -
nur_s 896.572 ** 847.957 ** 889.587 ** 893.461 ** 896.782 **
Year—Reference = 2010
2011 125.392 - 207.114 ** 126.026 * 203.974 ** 209.924 **
2012 146.193 ** 246.544 * 143.115 ** 241.001 * 253.344 *
2013 106.542 *** 204.394 - 101.886 ** 202.458 - 217.887 -
2014 115.008 ** 181.913 - 110.063 ** 184.284 - 200.543 -
Agrarian Region—Reference = 19-07
19-01 −103.537 *** −210.684 - −108.647 *** −203.130 - −200.241 -
19-02 6.241 - 153.985 - 3.754 - 171.681 - 186.836 -
19-03 90.899 *** −23.887 - 81.185 *** −20.397 - −17.447 -
19-04 −8.317 - 97.430 - −6.976 - 108.883 - 117.896 -
19-05 22.185 - 170.505 - 16.111 - 175.220 - 186.905 -
19-06 −47.948 * 113.103 - −54.068 * 122.238 - 137.390 -
const 368.818 ** 744.100 *** 392.240 ** 726.699 *** 706.983 ***
—— for control variables see Appendix D ——
Note: Sign. * = 0.10; ** = 0.05; *** = 0.01.
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4. Results and Discussion
Considering the focus of the analysis, five different HP models have been used in order to test
the stability in sign, significance, and magnitude of parameter estimates of OLS. Table 2 shows the
variability of land rental prices due to biogas plants and livestock density (as they compete for land use),
agricultural land use, year of signature of the contract, and location of the rented land. The parameter
estimates of other control variables are reported in Appendix D. The five specifications have the same
combination of control variables and differ for groups of biogas variables. Model 1 and Model 2 report
biogas variables at municipality and agrarian region level, respectively. Model 3 includes significant
biogas variables of Model 1 only, and Model 4 includes all significant variables at both municipal and
agrarian region levels. Finally, all of the biogas variables enter Model 5. As the regression outcomes
are stable in terms of the coefficients’ values and significance of the explanatory variable across the
five specifications, we will comment on the results of Model 5 because it is more comprehensive.
According to Model 5’s results, the regression has run on 812 land rental contracts against the
2063 available, because the econometric package dropped all of those observations missing at least
one of the variables considered in the model. Table 2 shows that the land rental price is positively
influenced by the livestock density and the agricultural land use for energy crops, forage alternation,
vegetables, and plant nursery. The first two years of contracts considered show the same relationship,
while the agrarian region of pertinence of the rent contract does not influence the dependent variable.
Among the control variables, the dimension of rented area and the presence of Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) subsidies affect the rental land price significantly and positively. Considering the farming
type, the livestock farm tenant is willing to pay more for land rent (from 106.3 to 709.5 €/ha) compared
to dairy farms (reference). A notable exception is represented by specialist goat farms that probably
rent marginal lands for grazing. Among the non-significant control variables are the length of the
contract, the share of UAA within the municipality (rurality), the presence of rural building in the
contract, the standard output of the tenant, the presence of second crops, and the type of land owner.
Considering the focus of this paper, the effects of biogas plant characteristics on the dependent
variable are the most relevant findings of the empirical analysis. Results show the significant relation
between the number of plants and the average installed kW per plant in the municipality and agrarian
region of the contract. Furthermore, the land rental price is linked to the kW per hectare of the
agricultural utilized area in the agrarian region, which is not confirmed at the municipal level.
As explained, these variables are used to approximate the effect of technology of the biogas plants
(plant’s average size, pp), the demand for maize silage for bioenergy production with respect to the
number of plants (number of plants, pl, and nominal capacity, kW), and the transportation costs of the
energy crops from fields to plants (municipal vs. agrarian region location of the rented land; _m and _r
suffixes, respectively).
Model 5 shows that biogas plants have a non-linear type effect on the rental land price according
to the power (pl and kW), the technologies used for the production of biogas (pp), and the distance
between the plants and the rented land. These trends, shown in the Figures 2–6, are in line with the
expected results with regards to the growing branches of the functions estimated. In fact, it does make
sense that land rental prices rise as the demand for land for energy crops (maize silage) increases.
On the contrary, the depressive effects of biogas on the price of land rent may be counterintuitive
and worth careful comment. In particular, Figure 2 shows that the rent in the agrarian region increases
to a value of 0.8 kW/ha installed power per hectare, then it starts to decrease. This bell-shaped trend
presumably derives from a sequence of interconnected events: increasing levels of kW installed per
hectare fosters the competition for energy crops, forcing producers to search for feedstock from more
and more distant areas and pushing up the cost of bioenergy input procurement [10,36]. Beyond a
certain threshold of installed power density, the competition for local land becomes economically
unviable and leads producers to shift from maize silage (which is bulky) to other biogas feedstocks.
Such alternative inputs may be local by-products deriving from agricultural, food, agro-industrial,
and forestry industries (as allowed by Ministerial Decree 6 July 2012 [37]) and/or imported biomass,
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which would explain the downward trend of rental prices for high kW/ha values. This hypothesis
could also explain the decreasing trend described in Figure 3.Energies 2016, 9, 965 13 of 25 
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The descending branches of the u-shaped curves, conversely, represents a somehow unexpected
effect. It may be explained by the possibility of postponement f manure spreading which reduces
the demand for land, decreasing its rental value, as in he Figure 4. This phenomenon is linked to the
biog s technology applied and is more pronounced in large areas as a r cultural regio s (Figure 5)
where we observed only a negative linear effect. A similar explanation may also apply to Figure 6,
which rel tes the rental land price and the umber of existing biogas plants in the agrarian region.
In particular, the price of lan decreases to an averag density of 24 plants because of t e delay of the
timing of manure spreading. With the increase of the number of plants, it starts to increase, as the
effect of competition for arable land becomes prevalent. The fact that the graph goes into the negative
range is not surprising, since these plots are used to describe the "pure" effect of the variable on the
rental amount.
Furthermore, we interpreted the positive an significant relationships between land rental price
and livestock pressure per hectares, land utiliz tion for forag alte nation, arable a d nergy crops
as a proof for competitio between food, fe d, and fuel. This would confirm the relevanc of the
“environment tril mma” for social and econom c susta nability of bioenergy that need to exploit
agricultural land to be produced. Additionally, w observ a statistically significant increase in rental
prices for contracts signed in 2011 and 2012, compared to 2010 (reference year). On the contrary,
in 2013 and 2014 such an effect is not significant. This may be the result of a change in biogas policy
that occurred exactly at the end of 2012. In particular, the Decree of 6 July 2012 [37] established a
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new subsidization scheme aimed at providing more incentives for smaller sized plants and for those
using agro-food by-products (the mentioned plants were in the following size ranges: 1–300 kW,
301–600 kW, and over 601 kW [35]). Therefore, while until the end of 2012 mainly large-sized plants
were running using maize silage, contributing for more pressure on land rental prices, from 2013 new
policies downturned the previous trend.
Finally, it is worth noting that coefficients of determination R2 of the model account for the 23.6%
of the variance, which means that the combination of dependent variables included in the model
explain a limited amount of variability in the dependent variable, as compared to previous studies.
Such low values in R2 may be due to the lack of information on soil quality, as explained in Section 3.3.
Furthermore, this limitation must be considered together with the peculiarities of the agricultural land
market. In fact, many drivers of land rental prices are difficult to be considered in the model because
of their nature. For example, the effect of human capital of both tenants and land owners may capture
information on characteristics of the relationships between the two parties. The presence and nature of
special clauses or verbal agreements do not enter the model because they are often non-reported in the
contract and, thus, out of reach for the researcher. All these factors considered, we are still moderately
optimistic in evaluating the reliability of the OLS results because of the stability shown by different
specifications and the accordance with expected results.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
In recent years, agricultural economists published a fair amount of studies dealing with the
analysis of the drivers of the agricultural land market. Obviously, these studies are constrained by
data availability and quality, thus researchers from different countries may possess some relevant
information and lack some others. The consequence is two-fold. On the one hand, the findings that
come from different data and econometric models suffer for repeatability and cannot be formally
confirmed (nor rejected). On the other hand, any scientifically-grounded and sound study on the land
market may potentially shed new light on this topic and significantly contribute to the accumulation
of specific knowledge on this field.
The present paper focused on the relationship between land rental prices and biogas production
(in terms of installed power, number and size of plants). We start from the simple observation that
biogas plants use some crops as feedstock to produce energy, thus representing a new source of
competition for land access. This is expected to affect the price of land rental. Specifically, the rationale
would be predicting a positive relation between installed kilowatt of biogas per agricultural area and
land rental price. Nonetheless, this expected phenomenon may take different shapes and intensities,
as the demand of bioenergy crops (and then the impact on land price) depends on a variety of
features [39], likes plant size, feedstock mix, and the transportation costs of bioenergy crops from fields
to plants [10].
We measured this phenomenon applying a hedonic price model in a case study area in Northern
Italy that was previously proven to be relevant for biogas plant installation [9]. We found that installed
power per hectare, number of plants, and average plant size significantly affect land rental prices in
a nonlinear fashion. Furthermore, such effects take different shapes according to the territorial level
to which the biogas feature operates (municipal or agrarian region). Such detected nonlinear effects
suggest that technologies and distances between the biogas plants and the rural area devoted to energy
crop production matter in determining the land rental price.
These findings may be considered socially and scientifically relevant because we measured the
thresholds for a significant effect of biogas plants characteristics on land rental prices, which could
be very useful for a bioenergy regulatory plan design. Considering that a policy-maker may be
interested in protecting food and feed production against excess competition exerted by bioenergy
crops, we identified a way to calculate the levels of kW per hectares and/or the best biogas plant’s
dimensions that help to reach this objective. Consequently, these results and the procedure could
be applied to set the parameters to incentivize the most efficient bioenergy policy in rural areas.
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Furthermore, we confirm previous evidence on the outcome of different biogas incentive schemes;
as pointed out by Bartoli et al. [10], subsidizing large-sized plants (that use mainly energy crops) would
lead to increased competition for land, while when small- and medium-sized plants (using prevalently
manure) are incentivized, such pressure on agricultural land would be reduced. Our findings are
in line with this hypothesis, as we estimated an increase in land rental prices only in those years
(2010 and 2011) where the large-sized plants were more subsidized, while such an effect is not
significant over the subsequent years (2013 and 2014) with the withdrawal of the old policy scheme.
For example, considering our case study, the findings indicate that the smallest and largest biogas
plants give the best social performance, i.e., they impact less on land rental prices. This seems to
be the basis for an optimal win-win policy based in incentivizing (1) small plants using livestock
manures, which helps breeders maintain adequate environmental standards without increasing their
feed cost; and (2) large plants using agro-food by-products, that need professionals to be consulted to
optimize the recycle of food waste restoring the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles. These considerations
are in line with evidence provided by biophysical economists on the feasibility of maize-based
bioenergy. The researchers, using non-monetary metrics, proved, in fact, that the bioenergy industry
is unsustainable when using agricultural commodities as energy inputs [40], while it is a desirable
option when using by-products both in social and energy efficiency terms [41]. Finally, the limitations
discussed in Section 3.3 deserve to be recalled. The lack of information, especially on soil quality,
macroeconomic factors and the import of agricultural commodities, suggests that our results omit
some relevant effects on land rental prices. From another viewpoint, these shortcomings may be
considered valuable recommendations for further studies.
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Appendix A. A Brief Tutorial to Interpret the Results of Hedonic Prices Analysis of
Farmland Attributes
To analyze the effect of biogas plants on land rental prices we used regression analysis in the form
of OLS. This statistical tool allows the isolation of the effect of one (or more) variable(s) of interest
(x1, x2) on a dependent variable (y) accounting for the role exerted by a set of control variables (cn) that
may mask true causal relationships [42]. OLS regression estimates the coefficients (β) of the following
equation (called “model”, henceforth):
y = α + β1x1 + β2x2 + βncn + ε (A1)
The estimated parameters of the equation measure the effects of the right hand side (explanatory)
variables on the dependent variable, y. For instance, the coefficient associated to the variable of
interest x1, is interpreted as follows:
β1 = ∆y/∆x1 (A2)
That is the change in the dependent variable y, as a consequence of a unit change in the explanatory
variable as if all the other variables that affect the y were held constant ceteris paribus. This is true
for continuous variables, while when the variable of interest is dichotomous (dummy variable, 0–1),
its β coefficient renders the change in y as the dummy changes its status (from 0 to 1, ceteris paribus).
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To get a reliable estimation of β coefficients for the variables of interest it is, therefore, necessary to
include in the equation all the variables that may have an influence on y. Such variables are called
“control variables” and are listed in Table 1 and Appendix B. The α coefficient expresses the value
that would take y (in our case the rental price) if all of the explanatory variables would be set to zero.
The right hand side of Equation (A1) has two components, one deterministic and the other stochastic
(ε). The deterministic component includes the constant plus each explanatory variable multiplied by
its associated coefficient and represents, for each observation in the sample, the value of the dependent
variable estimated by the model (yˆ). The stochastic component of the model (ε) represents, for each
observation in the sample, the difference between the actual and the estimated value of the dependent
variable (y – yˆ). For this reason, ε represents the error made by the deterministic component of the
model in forecasting the actual value of y. This concept, extended to all the observations of the sample,
is expressed by the R2, which represents the share of variability of y explained by the model.
Since the estimated values of coefficients have a probabilistic distribution, the associated p-value
tests (p-values, t-values, and standard errors associated to each variable in Table 2 and Appendix D
are used to test (accept or reject) the null hypothesis that each coefficient (and so the effect of each
variable on y) is equal to zero. For more details on the topic, please refer to Wooldridge [43] and
Wooldridge [44]) tell us whether the actual effect of each explanatory variable is significantly different
from zero. The p-value renders the probability to make a mistake in rejecting the hypothesis that
the coefficient is equal to zero. An explanatory variable exerts a statistically significant effect on the
dependent variable if its β coefficient has a p-value lower than 10%. Taking as an example the first
variable of Model 5 (pl_m) listed in the Table 2, its estimated coefficient is 99.32, whose meaning
is that each additional biogas plant in the municipality would cause an increase of 99.32 Euros per
hectare of farmland rent (ceteris paribus). Such an estimated effect has a p-value of 1%, resulting in
the probability that the variable pl_m does not affect farmland rent. It may be interesting to explore
whether a continuous explanatory variable exerts a nonlinear effect on the dependent variable. To do
so, the explanatory variable enters in the model both in level and in squared value. If both of the
coefficients are statistically significant, the variable exerts a nonlinear effect, while if only one of the
two coefficients is significant, its effect on the dependent variable is linear (like in the case of variable
pp_r). In the former case, if the coefficient of the variable in level is positive and those of the squared
variable is negative, the relationship is bell shaped (like for variables pl_m and kw_r) otherwise, if the
reverse is true, the relationship is “U” shaped (variables pp_m and pl_r). It may be helpful plotting
such nonlinear effects of a given variable x1 with respect to land rental price (Figures 2–6). To do so,
the estimated dependent variable (land rental price, the y) is computed according to the following
simpler form:
y = α + β1x1 + β12(x1)2 (A3)
Such an equation represents the true nonlinear effect of x1 on y, as the coefficients (α, β1, and β12)
have been taken from Equation (A1) and then account for the effect exerted by all the other variables
included in Model (1). Note that plotted equations represented by figures reported in Section 4 (Results)
have been computed using increasing values of the dependent variable (x1) within the range of its true
values in the sample.
In the present analysis, the use of land devoted to different crops is expressed as a share of the
total rented area. To avoid problems in estimation (the so called “dummy trap”, see Wooldridge [44]
for further details) it has been necessary to exclude a group of land use (in our case wood crops of
uncultivated land) that became the reference point. In other words, the coefficients of agricultural
land use parameters express the additional value of each land use, compared to the reference land use.
For example, referring to the results, a hectare of energy crops (variable ene_s) increase the value of
rented land of 378.5 Euros compared to the reference. As mentioned above, to get a reliable estimation
of coefficients, all of the variables that may affect the dependent variable should be included in the
model. For this reason we have considered several control variables in our analysis, nevertheless
part of the variability in the dependent variable may not be captured. In order to account for this
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omitted-variable component, we have included some dummies to control for both time and spatial
heterogeneity (year and agrarian region dummies, respectively) that may not be captured by the
other control variables. For both such dummies it was necessary to exclude one category (as in
the case of land use) to make the estimation tractable. For year dummies 2010 has been excluded,
to better measure the effect of biogas industry expansion over time. The year 2010 is then the reference
compared to which the time effect on rental prices is measured. For instance, the parameter of the year
2011 means that farmland rent prices increased, on average, by 209.92 Euros in 2011 compared to 2010.
Interestingly, only parameters of 2011 and 2012 are positive and significant, while those for 2013 and
2014 are not significantly different to zero, in line with the expected effect due to changes in biogas
subsidization schemes.
Appendix B. Legend of Some Control Variables in Table 1
Table B1. Legend of some control variables in Table 1.
Variable Description
Presence of second crops
sc_1 Forage alternation as second use of the land
sc_2 Corn as second use of the land
sc_3 Vegetables as second use of the land
Type of land owner
own_1 (reference) One person
own_2 More than one person
own_3 Private company
own_4 No profit/Public institution
Type of farming according to Reg. EC 1242/2008
tf _0 (reference) Specialist milk production
tf _1 Specialist cereals (other than rice), oilseeds and protein
tf _2 Specialist root crops
tf _3 Specialist root crops and cereals combined
tf _4 Specialist field vegetables
tf _5 Various field crops
tf _6 Various permanent crops combined
tf _7 Specialist milk production with cattle rearing
tf _8 Specialist cattle-mainly rearing
tf _9 Specialist cattle-mainly fattening
tf _10 Specialist sheep
tf _11 Specialist goats
tf _12 Various grazing livestock-no dominant enterprise
tf _13 Specialist pig fattening
tf _14 Pig rearing and fattening combined
tf _15 Specialist layers
tf _16 Specialist poultry-meat
tf _17 Pigs and poultry combined
tf _18 Market gardening and permanent crops combined
tf _19 Field crops and permanent crops combined
tf _20 Mixed cropping, mainly field crops
tf _21 Mixed livestock, mainly dairying
tf _22 Mixed livestock: granivores and dairying combined
tf _23 Mixed livestock: granivores with various livestock
tf _24 Dairying combined with field crops
tf _25 Field crops combined with grazing livestock other than dairying
tf _26 Grazing livestock other than dairying combined with field crops
tf _27 Field crops and granivores combined
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Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics of Regression Sample
Table C1. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables in regression sample.
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rent value (Dependent) Price of land rental per hectare per year 812 869.4 316.2 119.4 3241.7
Biogas plant-related variables
pl_m Number of biogas plants per municipality 812 1.3 1.6 0.0 7.0
pp_m Average power of biogas plants in the municipality 812 409.8 405.1 0.0 1130.5
kw_m Kilowatt per hectare of utilized agricultural area in the municipality 812 0.5 0.7 0.0 5.1
pl_r Number of biogas plants per agrarian region 812 18.0 10.1 2.0 36.0
pp_r Average power of biogas plants in the agrarian region 812 714.2 136.7 286.7 1021.3
kw_r Kilowatt per hectare of utilized agricultural area in the agrarian region 812 0.6 0.3 0.0 1.2
liv Livestock unit per utilized agricultural area in the municipality 812 3.6 2.2 0.0 19.8
Agricultural land use
w&u_s Share of land used for wood crops or uncultivated 812 3.3% 7.3% 0.0% 100.0%
mai_s Share of land used for corn and/or arable crops 812 41.7% 44.1% 0.0% 100.0%
ene_s Share of land used for energy crops 812 1.7% 11.5% 0.0% 100.0%
foa_s Share of land used for forage alternation 812 49.0% 44.4% 0.0% 100.0%
fop_s Share of land used for permanent forage 812 2.3% 13.2% 0.0% 100.0%
veg_s Share of land used for vegetables 812 1.1% 9.2% 0.0% 99.6%
vif_s Share of land used for vine and/or orchard 812 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
nur_s Share of land used for plant nursery 812 0.9% 9.1% 0.0% 100.0%
Other control variables—continuous
dim_c Dimension of the rented area by contract 812 13.0 18.5 0.2 188.0
dim_u Average dimension of agricultural units within the contracts 812 1.7 2.0 0.1 23.9
len Length of the contract 812 4.2 2.2 1.0 20.0
uaa Share of utilized agricultural area within the municipality 812 0.8 0.1 0.5 1.0
sto Standard output of the farm of the land tenant (continuous, €/year); 812 252.7 307.9 0.1 2680.8
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Table C2. Descriptive statistics of categorical variables in regression sample.
Variable Description Obs %
Other control variables—categorical
cap CAP subsidies coupled to the contract 812 -
Yes 118 14.5%
No 694 85.5%
bui Rural building on the rented area 812 -
Yes 74 9.1%
No 738 90.9%
Year 812 -
2010 (reference) Contract signed in 2010 80 9.9%
2011 Contract signed in 2011 158 19.5%
2012 Contract signed in 2012 142 17.5%
2013 Contract signed in 2013 160 19.7%
2014 Contract signed in 2014 272 33.5%
Agrarian Region 812 -
19-01 Pianura Cremasca 63 7.8%
19-02 Pianura di Crema 148 18.2%
19-03 Pianura soresinese dell’Adda 53 6.5%
19-04 Pianura di Soresina 162 20.0%
19-05 Pianura di Cremona 104 12.8%
19-06 Pianura fra Oglio e Po 186 22.9%
19-07 (reference) Pianura di Piadena 96 11.8%
Presence of second crops
sc_1 Forage alternation as second use of the land 812 -
Yes 137 16.9%
No 675 83.1%
sc_2 Corn as second use of the land 812 -
Yes 39 4.8%
No 773 95.2%
sc_3 Vegetables as second use of the land 812 -
Yes 1 0.1%
No 811 99.9%
Type of land owner 812 -
own_1 (reference) One person 450 55.4%
own_2 More than one person 258 31.8%
own_3 Private company 56 6.9%
own_4 No profit/Public institution 48 5.9%
Type of farming according to Reg. EC 1242/2008 812 -
tf _0 (reference) Specialist milk production 325 40.0%
tf _1 Specialist cereals (other than rice), oilseeds and protein 207 25.5%
tf _2 Specialist root crops 2 0.2%
tf _3 Specialist root crops and cereals combined 1 0.1%
tf _4 Specialist field vegetables 6 0.7%
tf _5 Various field crops 94 11.6%
tf _6 Various permanent crops combined 13 1.6%
tf _7 Specialist milk production with cattle rearing 5 0.6%
tf _8 Specialist cattle-mainly rearing 2 0.2%
tf _9 Specialist cattle-mainly fattening 6 0.7%
tf _10 Specialist sheep 1 0.1%
tf _11 Specialist goats 1 0.1%
tf _12 Various grazing livestock-no dominant enterprise 2 0.2%
tf _13 Specialist pig fattening 17 2.1%
tf _14 Pig rearing and fattening combined 21 2.6%
tf _15 Specialist layers 2 0.2%
tf _16 Specialist poultry-meat 3 0.4%
tf _17 Pigs and poultry combined 8 1.0%
tf _18 Market gardening and permanent crops combined 1 0.1%
tf _19 Field crops and permanent crops combined 5 0.6%
tf _20 Mixed cropping, mainly field crops 2 0.2%
tf _21 Mixed livestock, mainly dairying 10 1.2%
tf _22 Mixed livestock: granivores and dairying combined 6 0.7%
tf _23 Mixed livestock: granivores with various livestock 2 0.2%
tf _24 Dairying combined with field crops 6 0.7%
tf _25 Field crops combined with grazing livestock other than dairying 4 0.5%
tf _26 Grazing livestock other than dairying combined with field crops 2 0.2%
tf _27 Field crops and granivores combined 58 7.1%
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Appendix D. Estimation Results for Control Variables in Table 2
Table D1. Estimation results for control variables in Table 2.
Control Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Biogas Variables at
Municipality Level
Biogas Variables at
Agrarian Region Level
Biogas Variables at Municipality
Level w/out Nominal Capacity per ha
Biogas variables at Agrarian Region
Level w/out Nominal Capacity per ha
Biogas Variables at Municipality
and Agrarian Region Level
R-squared 0.221 0.225 0.218 0.233 0.236
Rent value (Dependent) Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
—— continue from Table 2 ——
Control variables
dim_c 2.310 ** 2.236 ** 2.202 ** 2.326 ** 2.428 **
dim_u 15.223 ** 15.048 ** 17.286 ** 12.774 * 10.931 *
dim_u2 −0.859 * −0.912 * −0.987 ** −0.755 - −0.633 -
len −9.267 * −8.033 - −9.280 * −8.257 - −8.135 -
uaa −50.528 - −82.320 - −73.841 - −96.297 - −72.901 -
cap 109.285 *** 125.554 *** 110.041 *** 118.537 *** 118.628 ***
bui 6.832 - 15.603 - 10.242 - 13.510 - 9.836 -
sto 0.106 - 0.098 - 0.106 - 0.093 - 0.092 -
Presence of second crops
sc_1 21.540 - 12.914 - 19.163 - 9.224 - 11.684 -
sc_2 40.007 - 17.944 - 39.094 - 25.959 - 26.728 -
sc_3 139.899 * 120.345 - 145.382 * 129.783 - 122.482 -
Owner type-Reference = own_1
own_2 20.789 - 19.277 - 21.208 - 18.457 - 18.234 -
own_3 −9.261 - −0.798 - −5.417 - −5.233 - −8.473 -
own_4 0.688 - 3.683 - 3.941 - −11.076 - −14.113 -
Type of farming-Reference = tf_0
tf _1 1.064 - 0.610 - 3.523 - −8.435 - −10.872 -
tf _2 170.323 - 137.066 - 186.942 - 124.774 - 106.468 -
tf _3 −82.899 - −174.195 ** −93.174 - −171.870 * −164.273 *
tf _4 −52.620 - −22.458 - −56.855 - −52.366 - −47.717 -
tf _5 25.565 - 35.391 - 30.944 - 20.901 - 16.056 -
tf _6 −204.011 * −223.600 ** −205.884 * −229.036 ** −226.480 **
tf _7 −39.267 - −71.925 - −33.472 - −76.557 - −80.888 -
tf _8 102.643 *** 83.942 ** 77.581 ** 80.533 * 106.334 ***
tf _9 231.592 *** 267.157 *** 242.201 *** 257.993 *** 247.880 ***
tf _10 352.260 *** 334.972 *** 371.944 *** 352.934 *** 333.749 ***
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Table D1. Cont.
Control Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Biogas Variables at
Municipality Level
Biogas Variables at
Agrarian Region Level
Biogas Variables at Municipality
Level w/out Nominal Capacity per ha
Biogas variables at Agrarian Region
Level w/out Nominal Capacity per ha
Biogas Variables at Municipality
and Agrarian Region Level
tf _11 −101.537 * −185.306 ** −101.052 - −175.819 ** −177.343 **
tf _12 538.903 ** 510.572 *** 544.978 *** 489.028 *** 460.058 **
tf _13 246.432 - 246.895 - 238.832 - 237.459 - 244.089 -
tf _14 118.824 ** 129.214 ** 111.109 ** 113.582 ** 120.252 **
tf _15 −91.049 - −156.699 - −105.140 - −143.692 - −132.877 -
tf _16 −21.456 - −37.905 - −16.518 - −33.648 - −38.420 -
tf _17 40.104 - 37.931 - 47.138 - 42.124 - 34.753 -
tf _18 18.412 - 17.392 - 41.180 - −43.124 - −66.142 -
tf _19 −78.368 - −86.363 - −82.564 - −87.760 - −84.056 -
tf _20 87.785 - 121.729 - 106.998 - 102.840 - 85.301 -
tf _21 190.640 - 202.495 - 193.148 - 197.602 - 195.028 -
tf _22 34.292 - 25.116 - 33.814 - 27.807 - 27.229 -
tf _23 724.318 *** 719.590 *** 728.958 *** 714.722 *** 709.477 ***
tf _24 −64.546 - −64.737 - −66.728 - −69.281 - −67.202 -
tf _25 184.111 ** 207.172 ** 193.104 ** 209.150 ** 199.997 **
tf _26 245.194 *** 278.272 *** 228.079 *** 243.287 *** 260.514 ***
tf _27 57.571 - 56.548 - 59.537 - 46.958 - 45.108 -
Note: Sign. * = 0.10; ** = 0.05; *** = 0.01.
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